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Abstract 
We analyse the effects of distortionary company car taxation through increased household car 
ownership for the Netherlands. We use several identification strategies and demonstrate that 
for about 20 percent of households company car possession increases car ownership. The 
annual welfare loss of distortionary company taxation through increased car ownership is 
generally rather small, maximally €120 per company car, and likely much less. However, for 
policies that exempt households from paying tax on their company car, the annual deadweight 
loss is likely higher. 
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1. Introduction 
The supply and demand for fringe benefits receive much attention in economic textbooks (e.g. 
Ehrenberg and Smith, 2003). The effect of distortionary fringe benefits taxation receives 
however little attention in the transport and urban economics literature. This is surprising, 
because there are strong indications that fringe benefit taxation has a strong effect on transport 
related fringe benefits. The main examples are employer free parking, which is a common 
fringe benefit in the US (e.g., Shoup, 2005; van Ommeren and Wentink, 2012) and company 
cars, which are cars that are provided by employers to employees for private usage. Company 
cars are widespread over the whole of Europe: about 40 percent of new cars are company cars 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2010). 1  
The reason why company car taxation is distortionary in Europe is easy to understand. 
In most European countries, the exact level of the tax depends mainly on the company car’s 
purchase price, but usually not on its private use (Copenhagen Economics, 2010). Cars which 
are provided to employees for private usage are taxed at a rather low rate so the households' 
implicit price of using a company car (including tax) is far below its market price.2 In these 
countries, the households' implicit price of a company car is usually between 20 to 50 below 
its market price. Given such a large price advantage, it is not so surprising that company cars 
are common in Europe. One potential justification for favourable company car taxation is that 
these cars increase workers' productivity. However, this appears not to be a convincing 
argument, because the large majority of the company cars are not, or hardly, used for business 
purposes. For example, only 20 percent of workers in the Netherlands regularly use their 
                                                 
1 Company cars are usually new, used for a period of about 3 to 4 years, and then sold on the 
secondhand market. In  Europe about 15 to 20% of two-adult households have access to a company 
car (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2011).  
2 To give a concrete example, in the Netherlands maximally 24 percent of the company car’s purchase 
price is added to annual  taxable income. However, the annual cost of such  a car is about 40 percent 
of its purchase price. In the literature it is common to distinguish between the price of owning and the 
price of using a car. This difference is not essential here, because employers usually pay for the 
possession of the car (usually through a  car lease) including insurance and taxes but also for its use 
including fuel consumption and repairs (Wuyts, 2009).  
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company car for business purposes (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2011).3 For 
Belgium, similar numbers are reported: less than 10 percent (20 percent) of trips (of mileage) 
with a company car are incurred for business purposes. Another interesting example is that 13 
percent of lower level administrative staff, for whom productivity effects of company cars are 
absent, receive a company car (De Borger and Wuyts, 2011). It is then not so hard to see that 
in most European countries, taxation of company cars is far from optimal.  
Distortionary company car taxation has several consequences for behaviour of 
households. One expects that the reduced price of having a (company) car induces households 
to demand a more expensive company car and travel more privately than they would 
otherwise. In a recent paper, we have shown that these behavioural changes imply that company 
car taxation is strongly distortionary and induces an annual welfare loss of about €350 to €700 
per company car (see, Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2011). Although such a 
welfare loss is substantial, this estimate has been argued to be still an underestimate because it 
ignores other behavioural changes. In particular, it is plausible that due to the company cars' 
reduced price, households will also increase car ownership, so the number of cars in the 
household will increase. This will be the focus of the current paper.  
There are several indications that increases in car ownership due to company car 
taxation is quantitatively important. First, about 25 percent of Belgian employees with a 
company car state that they would reduce household car ownership when they would not 
receive a company car (De Borger and Wuyts, 2011). Second, the household car ownership 
studies by Whelan et al. (2001) and Han (2001) suggest that the presence of a company car in 
the household increases car ownership.4 However, these two studies ignore a range of 
                                                 
3 However, even when a worker uses a company car for business purposes then this does not 
necessarily imply that the worker is more productive, because most workers use a car for commuting. 
So when not offered a company car, they may use a private  car for business purposes (and receive 
reimbursement from their employer for the marginal costs related to business trips).  
4 Empirical car ownership studies, which aim to explain the number of cars in the household are 
abundant in the transportation literature (see e.g., Kumar and Rao, 2006; Dargay and Gateley, 1999; 
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statistical and economic issues. In particular, they do not take into account endogeneity issues 
and control only for a few explanatory variables. Furthermore, they do not attempt to derive 
the welfare effects of distortionary taxation. The present work deals with these issues.  
Third, fuel price and car price elasticities of car ownership in the transport literature are 
suggestive. Note that some of these studies measure car ownership at the individual (rather 
than the household) level, so interpretation of the elasticities for our purpose is not 
straightforward. We focus on long-run elasticities.5 Two meta-analyses using different studies 
conclude that the long-run fuel price elasticity of ownership is around - 0.20 (Brons et al., 
2008; Goodwin et al., 2004). This suggests that the presence of a company car, which reduces 
the fuel price toward zero, may increase the number of cars through free fuel only by, on 
average, 14 percent ((log(2) - log (1)) × -0.20), as most company car owners receive free fuel 
for private travel. The long-run car price ownership elasticity is estimated to be between - 0.1 
and -0.5 (Ubbels, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2004; Dargay and Vythoulkas, 1999; Johansson and 
Schipper, 1997), whereas the more elastic estimate is more common.6 If a company car is 
offered to employees at an effective price that is 20 to 50 percent below the price in the car 
market, as is common in Europe, then current studies suggest an increase in car ownership of 
10 to 30 percent. 
Company cars are predominantly taxed in Europe based on the company car’s purchase 
price. We focus on the Netherlands where the implicit average price of a company car paid by 
the household is about 30 percent below its market price (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren, 2011). The level of the company car tax does not depend on the extent of business 
use. However, economic theory indicates that optimal fringe benefits taxation must not be 
                                                                                                                                                        
Holtzclaw, 1994). However, these studies ignore company cars, which is a major omission when 
applied to European countries. 
5 We focus on the long-run, because it is then plausible that households fully adapt to changes in 
prices, similar to households that have a company car and are confronted with different prices.  
6 It is suggested in the literature  that most of the reported car price elasticities of ownership are 
downward biased, because they omit car quality measures, so the price elasticities are plausible 
somewhat larger. 
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based on the company car’s purchase price, but must be derived from the firm’s costs of 
providing a company car, e.g. the leasing price, (and any compensation that a worker receives 
for the marginal cost of business trips (e.g. fuel costs) must not be taxed), as is the current 
practice in the US. However, the latter tax policy requires differentiation between business 
and private kilometres for tax purposes, which entails higher monitoring costs for tax 
authorities. Similarly, in some European countries, the level of company car tax depends on 
the combination of company car's private and business use (Copenhagen Economics, 2010).7  
Rather obviously, company car possession only increases household car ownership if 
there is any demand for more than one car in the household. So, for single-person households 
who own a private car, car ownership is unlikely to increase when they receive a company 
car, as single-person households seldom desire more than one car. However, in two-adult 
households with one private car, car ownership is more likely to increase, because there is 
usually a latent demand for a second car. One expects then that an increase in car ownership is 
particularly likely to happen, if the company car is an imperfect substitute for the private car. 
For this reason, we identify the effect of distortionary company car taxation on car 
ownership for two-adult households in the Netherlands. We do so by estimating the effect of 
company car possession (which captures a car price reduction due to company car taxation) 
on the decision to have more than one car for a sample of two-adult households who have at 
least one car. Households with cars have usually little reason to refuse a company car, which 
will be cheaper than their private car, as a part of their employment contract. This implies that 
whether a household has a company car is mainly determined by the firm’s company car 
policy and therefore by the household's members specific occupations (Tillema et al., 2008). 
This strongly reduces the likelihood that company car possession is endogenous with regard 
                                                 
7 For example, in the UK, until recently, the tax level decreased strongly with business mileage.  
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to household car ownership. Nevertheless, as endogeneity cannot be excluded, we will mainly 
focus on estimates where endogeneity is addressed.  
In the next section, we discuss the theoretical setting. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows: section 3 provides information on the data used, introduces the different 
statistical models and presents the empirical results. Sections 4 and 5 examine the welfare 
analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theory 
To determine the welfare effects of the tax treatment of company cars, we use a standard 
household model that includes wages and identical cars (see Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren, 2011, who allow for heterogeneous cars). We assume that the labour market is 
perfectly competitive and the car market is perfectly competitive with a horizontal supply 
curve.8 The car price is denoted by p. For simplicity, we assume that a household does not 
demand more than two cars. When the household owns a car, the indicator z equals one, 
otherwise it is zero; when the household owns also another car, the indicator x equals one, 
otherwise it is zero. There is only one other composite good y. Labour income is denoted by 
m and τ denotes the marginal income tax. The household maximizes utility U(z,x,y) given a 
household income constraint: p(z +x) + y = m(1− τ), where the price of y is standardized to 
one. Let us now assume that z equals 1. This is in line with our data, as (almost) all 
households have at least one car.  
            Given these assumptions, the household utility function may be written as a standard 
two-good utility function U(x,y) given the constraint px + y = m(1− τ) −p. The function 
x(p,m(1− τ) −  p) is then the  Marshallian car demand function for the second car. In case the 
                                                 
8 The results by Zax (1988) suggest that monopsony has little effect on the welfare effects of fringe 
benefits taxation, so this issue will be ignored. The car market is described by the partial-equilibrium 
perfectly competitive model, where costs and pre-tax prices are not affected by the tax distortion. We 
abstract from market power by car suppliers (see Berry et al., 1995; Verboven, 1996). 
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household has two private cars (and has no demand for a third car), then company car 
possession will have no effect on car ownership. We will therefore from now on focus on a 
household that has one private car (rather than two), so x = 0. For this household holds that 
U(0, m(1− τ) − p) exceeds U(1, m(1− τ) − 2p). 
            Suppose that the tax authorities allow firms to offer one company car as a fringe 
benefit. So we now focus on the firm that offers a company car and gross income mc. The tax 
system values the company car at a price H, where H < p. In a competitive labour market, a 
firm chooses to offer a company car when total labour costs will fall, so mc+p ≤ m and the 
utility of the household must remain the same implying that 
c cU(0, m - (m +H)) U(0, m(1- ) -p) .   A (textbook) non-distortionary tax treatment of company 
cars requires that  H = p and mc+p = m. The latter equality implies that labour expenses of the 
firm, and therefore its profit, do not depend on company car taxation and that company car 
taxation only distorts the car market. 
It is reasonable to assume that company cars and private cars are either perfect 
substitutes, imperfect substitutes9 or unrelated goods. For convenience, we will focus on the 
case that these cars are either perfect substitutes or unrelated goods. Let us suppose first that 
the company car is a perfect substitute for the private car. As the company car is cheaper than 
the private car the household will always accept the company car and then decide whether or 
not to have a private car. The function   , 1c cx p m H    is then the household's 
Marshallian demand function for the second car conditional on receiving a company car. 
When a household receives a company car at a reduced price, there may be an income and a 
substitution effect on car demand. The income effect is likely small, because firms that offer 
company cars reduce wages at the same time. Given a competitive labour market (or a 
                                                 
9 When the type of car received as a company car is not the preferred choice of the household then the 
company car is an imperfect substitute. This was common  in the 90s when the lease market for cars 
was not well developed in Europe, so company cars were usually owned by the employer without 
considering the preferences of households. 
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quasilinear utility function), there is even no income effect of receiving a car at a lower price. 
So, the price effect of company car taxation on household car ownership must be interpreted 
as the compensated price effect. So, assuming that there is no income effect of receiving a 
company car, this implies that xc = x. Hence, given the assumption that the company car is a 
perfect substitute, company car taxation does not induce welfare losses through changes in 
car ownership. 
Let us now suppose that company and private cars are unrelated goods. This may be due 
to a number of reasons. One reason is that other members of the household are not allowed to 
drive the company car due to car insurance reasons (this is, for example, standard in the UK, 
but not in the Netherlands). Another reason might be, applicable in the Netherlands after 
2002, that the tax paid on receiving a company car depends on the number of kilometres 
driven privately (discussed in detail later on). It may also be case the company car is used for 
commuting, and other members of the household need a car for commuting. 
In the case that company cars and private cars are unrelated goods, the household 
decides to accept the offer of the company car, its utility is equal to c cU(1, m - (m +H)- p)  
otherwise it is equal to U(0, m(1− τ) − p). Given mc+p = m, one can show that  p – τ(p − H) 
can be interpreted as the household's effective price for the company car and – τ(p − H) as the 
company car tax advantage. The function     , 1c cx p p H m p      is then the 
household's Marshallian demand function for the second car conditional on receiving a 
company car. We aim to estimate the demand for a second car, conditional on receiving, or 
not receiving, a company car, which is the basis of our welfare analysis. We then focus on the 
difference in the demand for a second car for households with or without a company car, so 
we focus on the difference between x and xc. 
Given estimates of the demand function, and the assumption that the company car is 
either a perfect substitute or unrelated to private car, it is straightforward to determine the 
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welfare effect of the tax treatment of the company car. In our estimates, we control for 
income. When income is given, consumer’s surplus is a reasonable approximation of welfare. 
We assume that the demand for the second car is a linear function of its price, so the reduction 
in consumer surplus and therefore welfare, can be calculated using the rule of half.10 The 
change in demand for a second car due to company car procession is then equal to the change 
in the probability of having two cars due to receiving a company car. We denote the change in 
this probability by P. Assuming that company car possession implies a subsidy equal to Ω, the 
reduction in consumer surplus through increased car demand is equal to 0.5 P Ω. This 
calculation of the welfare effect in this way is rather rough. First, we assume that company 
cars are either a complete substitute or unrelated to private cars and, second, we ignore that 
demand for a second car is a discrete demand. However, our welfare estimates are a 
reasonable estimate of the order of magnitude of the incurred deadweight loss. 
Distortionary company car taxation may not only increase car ownership but may also 
increase the demand for commuting (see Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2011). If 
we assume that household utility is additive-separable in commuting and car ownership, then 
we may examine the distortionary effect of company car taxation on car ownership ignoring 
its effect on commuting distance. As this assumption may not hold, we will also report 
estimates controlling for commuting distance. Another issue is that we ignore that some 
company cars are productive and that the car market is distorted by purchase and user taxation 
which may result in an overestimate of the welfare loss caused by company car taxation. We 
address both issues later on by making assumptions on the proportion of company cars that 
are  productive and by taking other distortionary taxation into account.  
                                                 
10 We ignore here that a car is a discrete good. Assuming a discrete demand function, welfare analysis 
is possible using the methodology proposed by Small and Rosen (1981). 
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3. Car ownership demand analysis 
3.1. The data  
We aim to estimate the effect of company car possession on car demand in the household. Our 
empirical analysis is based on information from the annual 1995–2009 DNB (Dutch Central 
Bank) survey, which is a household panel survey. As there are only a few households with 
more than two cars, we model car demand as a discrete choice between one or more than one 
car. In all analyses, we employ samples of two-adult households that possess at least one car 
(and which contain at least one full-time employed adult).11 To facilitate interpretation of our 
results, we also exclude a few observations referring to households that have two company 
cars. Furthermore, we exclude observations when the head of the household is self-employed 
or relevant information is missing.12 In total we have 7,429 observations for 2,644 
households.  
Descriptive statistics show that 14.7 percent of the households own a company car 
and 20 percent of the households own (at least) two cars. Bivariate statistics suggest a strong 
relationship between company car possession and car ownership: 45 percent of households 
with a company car have (at least) two cars, whereas this applies to 15 percent of households 
without a company car. This suggests that company car possession increases household car 
ownership by 30 percent. 
In the multivariate analyses, we will use several identification strategies. One of our 
identification strategies implies a household fixed-effects approach, so this identification 
strategy relies on changes over time in household company car possession and household car 
                                                 
11 Given an unconstrained choice of the data the statistical analysis becomes cumbersome, as the 
presence of a company car is then endogenous, as it indicates the presence of at least one car. This 
selection is not problematic, because merely 6% of households do not own a car and these households 
seldom belong to the social group of households who receive a company car offer. 
12 For most variables, information is almost complete. The main exception is household income which 
is missing for about one third of the observations. Including these observations, and using a control 
dummy variable to control for missing income, generates almost identical effects. 
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ownership. It appears that there is sufficient time variation in both variables: we observe 360 
household changes in car ownership and 112 household changes in company car possession. 
 
3.2. Empirical  analysis  
In our empirical application, car demand is captured by a dichotomous variable which 
measures whether the number of cars exceeds one. To estimate the effect of car ownership on 
car demand, we rely on linear probability models (rather than discrete choice models).13 We 
estimate specifications with ordinary regression (OLS), with instrumental variables (IV) as 
well as with household fixed effects (FE). We use a range of relevant time-varying control 
variables, including number of children, household income (in log), residence ownership, five 
dummy indicators which capture population density in the municipality of residence, head 
employment status (permanently or temporarily employed), partners employment 
employment status (employed or non-employed). Further, we control for year and residence 
region dummies. When we do not control for household fixed effects, we also control for 
head’s age, gender and education (which are not identified given year dummies and 
household fixed effects). For now, we assume that the effect of company car possession is a 
constant and the same for all households, so it does not depend on calendar time or household 
characteristics. 
Our main finding is that the possession of a company car strongly increases the number 
of cars in the household. This holds for all identification strategies (see Table 1). For the OLS 
estimates without any control variables except for year dummies, the effect of company car on 
car ownership is 0.29 (and highly statistically significant with a standard error of less than 
                                                 
13 The main reason is that in one of our estimation strategies we use  household fixed effects. Given a 
logit specification with fixed effects, parameters can be consistently estimated using a conditional 
likelihood procedure, but, the marginal effects of explanatory variables, in which we are interested, are 
then not defined. Another issue is that for fixed effects logit models, parameters are entirely identified 
using households that change car ownership. This is problematic, because it is plausible that those 
households that change ownership are on average more sensitive to changes in prices of cars than 
other households.  
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0.02, see [1]). Controlling for a range of control variables, only slightly reduces the effect to 
0.25, see [2].14 The rather small change in the effect of company car for these two 
specifications is relevant information, as it implies that company car possession is only 
weakly correlated with observed control variables that strongly affect car demand (e.g. 
household income). This makes it less likely that correlation of company car possession with 
unobserved variables that affect car demand preferences is an important issue. As a company 
car implies a price reduction of about 30 percent and about 20 percent of the households have 
(at least) two cars, the implied price elasticity for the second car in the household based on the 
OLS estimates is above -1. This seems quite reasonable. 
 
Table 1. Effects on Number of Cars in the Household (1995–2009) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
    |     
 Variables OLS OLS FE FE IV
Company car 0.285  
(0.015)*** 
0.250  
(0.013)*** 
0.428  
(0.023)*** 
0.425 
(0.023)*** 
0.302 
(0.056)*** 
Number of children  0.009  (0.005)  
0.007  
(0.010) 
0.009  
(0.005) 
Household income (log)  0.128  (0.011)***  
0.016 
(0.011)* 
0.124 
(0.012)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes No Yes Yes 
Household fixed effects No No Yes Yes No 
R2 0.07 0.12 0.80 0.81  
No. observations 7429 7429 7429 7429 7429 
No. households 2644 2644 2644 2644 2644 
Notes: Control variables refer to five dummy indicators for residential density, five dummy indicators for 
education, gender, age and its square, whether the partner is employed, house ownership, head of 
household is permanent employed.***, *– indicate that estimates are significantly different from zero at 
0.01and 0.10 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Nevertheless, one may argue that these OLS estimates are mainly due to housework 
sorting: it is possible that employees of households with a strong preference for cars are more 
likely to sort themselves into jobs that offer company cars (and are also more likely to bargain 
                                                 
14 The control variables have the expected effects (e.g. income has a strong positive effect; the implied 
income elasticity is about 0.64). 
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for this fringe benefit conditional on the specific job), which suggests that the OLS estimate is 
biased and is an overestimate.  
So we have estimated models with household fixed effects, which control for time-
invariant preferences for cars. We now find that the effect of company car is not lower, but 
substantially higher and equal to 0.43 (see [3]). This finding is robust to the inclusion of 
control variables (see [4]). Our results that the fixed effects estimate is higher than the OLS 
estimate is plausible, because fixed effects estimates must be interpreted as short-run 
estimates. Because not all households who receive a company car will immediately sell their 
private car, it is plausible that the short-run effect exceeds the long-run effect.15  
By controlling for household effects, we avoid arguments that households with strong 
preferences for cars sort themselves into jobs with company cars so that the effect of company 
car is due to time-invariant unobserved car preferences of households. Further, we control for 
many time-varying demand variables including income and the number of children. However, 
one may argue that the presence of time-varying unobserved demand variables creates an 
estimation bias (e.g. a sudden increase in the demand for the second car induces employees 
without a company car to sort themselves into other jobs that offer company cars).  
A relevant example which comes to mind is that company cars are offered to workers 
who do not use a car for commuting and that these cars are offered by organisations that are 
difficult to reach other than by car. In this case, one may argue that the effect we have 
identified above is not merely due to reduced price for the company car but also due to the 
length of the commute, so we have an overestimate. To address this point, we have re-
estimated the models adding a control for the head’s commuting distance (we have 
information about this variable after the year 2001). We find that the effect of company car 
                                                 
15 Households who receive a company car may not immediately sell their private car for several 
reasons: first, it takes time to find a buyer; second, some households may be uncertain of the expected 
employment duration and company car possession may be considered temporary; third, some 
households might be uncertain of the benefits of having more than one car and keep the private car for 
a short period to experience the advantage of having two cars. 
 14
remains the same (see Table 2).16 Furthermore, we have estimated IV models (with and 
without controlling for commuting distance) using as an instrument whether or not the 
households head is employed by a public organisation.17  
 
Table 2. Effects on Number of Cars in the Household  
controlling for commuting distance (2001–2009) 
 [1] [2] 
    
 Variables OLS IV 
Company car 0.312 
(0.056)*** 
0.261 
(0.096)*** 
Commuting distance (log) 0.035 0.040
 (0.008)*** (0.011)*** 
Number of children 0.017  
(0.005)* 
0.017  
(0.008)* 
Household income (log) 0.119 
(0.012)***
0.110  
(0.020)***
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Household fixed effects No No 
R2 0.13  
No. observations 2397 2397 
No. households 840 840 
Notes: see Table 1.  
 
So the assumption we make is that, given household income and other observed demand 
indicators (e.g. number of children, commuting distance), the demand for cars is exogenous 
with respect to whether the head of the household is employed by a public organisation. In the 
specification we distinguish between two types of public organisations (civil servants and 
others, such as hospitals). These instruments are strong with an F-test of 170. A standard 
overidentification test does not reject the instruments (however, as the instruments are similar 
                                                 
16 In this specification we ignore that commuting distance is potentially endogenous. We are not able 
to control for other private kilometres travelled as it is unobserved in this dataset. However, this is less 
relevant as private travel (excluding commuting) is roughly the same for households with and without 
a company car (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2011). 
17 In the dataset, we do not have specific information about the type of industry, but we have 
information about the names of the pension fund of the current employer. In this way, we are able to 
derive the type of industry in an unusual way. So, we are able to distinguish between employees that 
work in public organisations  (government, universities) or private organisations. We are also able to 
distinguish between broad categories of private organisations. This information is later on used in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
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in nature, the power of this test may be argued to be limited). These instruments are 
potentially problematic, as one may argue that workers of households who do not plan to have 
many cars are more likely to work in a public organisation. We are not too worried about this 
for several reasons. First, if these instruments are invalid, then the company car effect of the 
instrumental variables estimate is likely lower than (or equal to) the OLS estimate. This is not 
what we find, it appears that the IV estimate is slightly higher than the OLS estimate, and 
equal to 0.30 (a standard Hausman test does not reject the exogeneity of company car).  
 
Table 3. Effects on Number of Cars in the Household (1995-1999) 
 [1] [2] 
 
 Variables OLS IV 
Company car 0.201  
(0.018)*** 
0.223 
(0.068)*** 
Number of children -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Household income (log) 0.189  
(0.019)*** 
0.183  
(0.021)*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Household fixed effects No No 
R2 0.12 
No. observations 3096 3096 
No. households 1570 1570 
Notes: see Table 1.  
 
Second, we find the same results for subsamples for which sorting can be excluded. In 
particular, if we re-estimate the IV model on data for the years 1995 until 1999, we find again 
that the IV estimate is almost exactly equal to the OLS estimate (0.223 and 0.201 
respectively), see Table 3. For this subsample, household sorting based on company car 
possession is extremely unlikely, because most workers employed between 1995 and 1999 
have chosen to work either in the private or public sector about 20 years before, when it still 
was uncommon to offer company cars to employees for private use. This argument rests on 
the observation that the annual transition rate from public to private sector employment is 
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close to zero for our sample (it is 0.0087) and the average worker with a company car in the 
period between 1995 and 1999 is 46 years, so this worker started to work in the beginning of 
the 70s. 
Third, as an informal way to test the validity of the instruments, we have included both 
instruments directly into the OLS regression, see similarly Arzaghi and Henderson (2008). 
When company car possession is correlated with unobserved household characteristics, then 
the instruments will absorb some of the bias of the company car. If the instruments are not 
valid, the effect of company car should decline. Given this specification however, we find an 
almost identical coefficient for company car compared to the first OLS estimate, suggesting 
that our instruments are valid.18 
Fourth, the instrument relies on the explicit assumption that type of sector does not 
directly influence car demand, which is implemented by distinguishing between public and 
private sector. Hence, one way to test for the validity of our public sector instruments is to 
distinguish between different types of private sector (e.g. bank, retail) and use type of private 
sector as a control variable in the IV approach. When we control for type of private 
employment, we find exactly the same effect for company car, and, importantly, we do not 
find any evidence that type of private sector has any direct effect on car ownership.19 In 
particular, this suggests that our estimates are not driven by differences in workplace location 
(as firms strongly differ in terms of location; for example, business services and industry are 
typically located at different locations) and also not driven by differences in demand for 
business trips (as firms strongly differ in their demand for business trips). 
We conducted several additional analyses to evaluate the sensitivity of the reported 
effect of company car possession on car demand. In particular, one may argue that the effect 
                                                 
18 It also appears that our instruments have no direct impact on car ownership conditional on including 
company car possession suggesting that any effect of sector is through company car possession. 
19 As an informal test, we exclude company car in the OLS analysis, and find a strong effect of type of 
private sector which also implies that the effect of type of private sector is entirely through company 
car possession, supporting our assumption that public sector is a valid instrument. 
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of household income on car demand is non-linear, so we added the square (and also the cubic) 
of net household income in log as controls, but find that the results remain the same.  
We re-estimated the models by splitting the sample in low and high income households. 
This is interesting because the marginal income tax is somewhat increasing in income and 
price elasticities of demand may differ by income. We find roughly the same estimates for 
both income groups. Finally, we estimated all models using a probit specification. In essence, 
the average marginal effect given this specification is almost exactly equal to the marginal 
effect of the linear specification. We will continue now on the assumption that the 0.20 
estimate is the most accurate estimate. We emphasise that this is a  conservative estimate 
given the range of estimated coefficients. About 12 percent of all personal cars in the 
economy are company cars, so the presence of company cars increases the overall number of 
cars on the economy by about 2.4 percent. This seems a substantial number, but this number 
is not indicative about the welfare effects of company car taxation. 
 
4. Welfare effects through changes in car ownership 
To examine the welfare effects of current company car taxation, we use market averages. The 
additional annual expenditure on a car is about €4000. The tax advantage is assumed to be 30 
percent. The annual loss of consumer surplus is then equal to 0.5*0.2*€4000*0.3 = €120.20 
This is a useful estimate, but it is also useful to consider the plausible range of the deadweight 
loss. For the households that do not pay any tax on the company car (those that do not drive 
privately, except for commuting), the subsidy is about 0.5. Given the (conservative) 
assumption that for these households the probability to increase car ownership is 0.2 (so it is 
not higher for households that do not drive privately except for commuting), the annual 
                                                 
20 One objection to our analysis may be that employers that lease a large number of cars receive bulk 
discounts due to a reduction in transaction costs. Bulk discounts are typically less than 10%, but 
precise figures are unknown to us. If we assume that employers provide company cars at an average 
reduction of 5% (and that these reductions are not due to market power), then the welfare loss due to 
the tax distortion is overestimated by 5%. 
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welfare loss is at least €200 (0.5*0.2*€4000*0.5). For countries such as Belgium, where 
households are exempted from paying tax on company cars, €200 seems the more plausible 
welfare loss.  
In the Netherlands, there are about 800,000 company cars. As explained in the 
introduction some of these company cars may be productive, but previous studies indicate that 
maximally 20 percent of the company cars are productive. Let us first assume that the effect 
of company car on household car ownership does not depend on whether the company car is 
productive. This implies that 600,000 company cars are used merely for private reasons. 
Given a welfare loss of €120 per company car, the annual welfare loss of distortionary 
company car taxation through increased household car ownership is about €70 million. 
Clearly, the deadweight loss of distortionary company car taxation is sizeable. Nevertheless, 
this loss is only 10 percent of the reported deadweight loss of company car taxation due to 
increased expenditure on the company car as well as increased driving (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau 
and van Ommeren, 2011). However, one may argue that the €70 million is still an 
overestimate because company cars that are productive are less likely a substitute for a private 
car (when a car is used for business reasons, it cannot be used by other members of the 
household), implying that the annual welfare loss is maximally €70 million. 
Our data allow us to examine the effects of policy changes. Company cars are taxed as a 
fringe benefit when they are privately used. So, tax authorities have to define what private use 
implies. For an increasing number of trips it turns out to be difficult to determine whether the 
trip with the company car is for business or for private reasons. This is particularly the case 
for business trips that originate from the employee's home. For this reason, after the year 
2002, Dutch tax authorities have stipulated that all commuting trips were considered business 
trips. This implies that if the company car is not used privately except for commuting, then it 
is regarded as a non-taxable fringe benefit. This gives an incentive to households to use the 
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company car only for commuting, and to buy another private car which can be used for other 
private trips (e.g. holidays).  So, one expects that after 2002, company car possession has a 
stronger effect on household car ownership than before.21 
We find evidence of this in the OLS specification if we include the interaction of 
company car with calendar year. The increased effect is statistically significant and about 0.08 
(with a standard error of 0.03). However, given a households fixed effect specification, we do 
not find any evidence: the effect is highly insignificant and the point estimate is even slightly 
negative (-0.02). For the instrumental variable estimation procedure, we find a positive effect 
of about 0.13, but it is not statistically significant (the standard error is 0.10). So, the different 
approaches do not agree on whether this policy change has increased the distortionary effect 
of company car taxation. 
 
5. Welfare effects: sensitivity analyses 
In our calculation of welfare effects, we assumed a world in which company car taxation is 
the sole tax distortion in the economy. Car taxes entail taxes on purchase, use and fuel (e.g., 
Craft and Schmidt, 2005 and Bento et al., 2009). The aggregate revenues from these taxes are 
considerably, so, in principle, they cannot be ignored. Arguably, fuel and user taxes may be 
justified as second-best instruments to finance road maintenance costs and to address 
congestion and other externalities associated with travel (Vickrey, 1963; Small and Bento, 
2005; de Palma et al., 2006; Small and Verhoef, 2007). However, this is less plausible for 
purchase taxes, which apply to new car purchases. The car purchase tax during our 
observation period was 42.3 percent (for most cars). About 40 percent of the overall car 
                                                 
21 However, at the same time, the tax on company cars was slightly increased, which reduces the 
probability that a company car is offered by the firm, so the increase in welfare loss per company car 
may have been offset by a reduction in the number of company cars. Furthermore, employees have a 
strong incentive to cheat by declaring that the car is only used for commuting but not for other trips. 
Cheating households do not have an additional incentive to increase car ownership.According to the 
tax authorities, about 20% of households cheat.  
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expenses relate to fixed costs, so the purchase tax disadvantage in terms of overall car 
expenses is 17 percent (0.40 × 0.423), which is substantially smaller than the tax advantage 
obtained from the provision of a company car (about 30 percent). Therefore, our results are 
qualitatively robust with respect to the presence of other distortionary car taxes. When the 
purchase taxes are fully distortionary, the imputed subsidy is only 13 percent, but also the 
estimated distortionary tax effect of company car possession on car ownership is presumably 
much lower than 0.2. If we presume that the effect of car ownership given this smaller 
subsidy is 0.1 then the annual deadweight loss per company car is only €30, which is 
substantially less than the € 120 indicated above. However, purchase taxes may address a 
number of negative car externalities, including accident externalities which increase in the 
number of cars on the road, parking externalities (cars need space that is usually provided for 
free) and congestion externalities in cities. Thus, purchase taxes are not fully distortionary. 
When the purchase tax will be abolished (in 2016), €120 is the more accurate estimate of the 
deadweight loss through increased car ownership.22 
 
6. Conclusions 
Economic theory is quite clear on how fringe benefits such as company cars should optimally 
be taxed. In Europe, company cars are common, but the welfare effects of the current tax 
system in Europe have hardly been analysed. We study the welfare effect of company car 
taxation through increased household car ownership. We find that for the Netherlands for 
about 20 percent of households, company car possession increases car ownership. Our results 
                                                 
22 Tax advantage given to company cars may (partially) compensate for the presence of distortionary 
purchase taxes on personal cars that are substantial in Europe. Since in most other European countries, 
purchase car taxes are lower than in the Netherlands, our conclusion that the tax system is 
distortionary regarding company cars can be generalized to other European countries. This conclusion 
may not hold in countries such as Denmark and Norway, where purchase taxes are 180% respectively 
100% of the car’s purchase price. For these countries, it is possible that favourable company car 
taxation generates substantial welfare benefits as purchase taxes on personal cars can be argued to be 
too high in these countries, so that company car taxation corrects for the purchase tax distortion.  
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imply that the tax treatment of company cars induces an annual deadweight loss per company 
car of maximally €120 due to increased car ownership. Our results suggest further that tax 
authorities' definition of private travel has implications for welfare. When a commuting trip is 
defined by tax authorities as a business trip, then this increases the incentive for households to 
increase car ownership. So, for policies that exempt households from paying tax on their 
company car by defining commuting trips as a business trips, the annual welfare loss may be 
much higher than €120. 
          Allowing for productivity effects of company cars and the presence of other 
distortionary taxation (e.g. purchase car taxation), the estimated total annual welfare loss due 
to distortionary company car taxation through increased car ownership is rather moderate and 
about €30 per car. This deadweight loss is only a small proportion (less than 10 percent) of 
the welfare loss reported due to increased expenditure on the company car as well as due to 
increases in car mileage (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2011). The result that the 
deadweight loss consists mainly of a shift towards more expensive cars is consistent with a 
literature that points out that car demand is rather price elastic (Bento et al., 2009), whereas 
the demand for car ownership is more price inelastic (Small and Verhoef, 2007).  
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